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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a staff member from a non-governmental organization (NGO)
like the Open Society Institute approaching an HIV-positive prostitute and
telling her that she may no longer receive treatment because the NGO does
not promote prostitution.1 Then imagine an NGO closing a drop-in center
used to safely house and train vulnerable sex workers for fear of losing
funding from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).2
Now imagine a scenario where the same NGO successfully assisted sex
workers to develop safe sex practices in brothels by distributing 350,000
free condoms every month.3 This NGO was poised to expand its training

1. See Penelope Saunders, Prohibiting Sex Work Projects, Restricting Women’s
Rights: The International Impact of the 2003 U.S. Global AIDS Act, 7 HEALTH & HUM.
RTS. 179, 187 (2004) (discussing successful HIV/AIDS programs and the prosecution
of prostitution).
2. See Maurice I. Middleberg, The Anti-Prostitution Policy in the U.S. HIV/AIDS
Program, 9 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 3, 7-8 (2006) (describing the “pattern of selfcensorship” leading to the closure of many effective anti-AIDS programs).
3. See CTR. FOR HEALTH & GENDER EQUITY, IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. POLICY
RESTRICTIONS FOR HIV PROGRAMS AIMED AT COMMERCIAL SEX WORKERS 3 (2008)
BRIEF],
available
at
[hereinafter
POLICY
http://www.genderhealth.org/files/uploads/change/publications/aplobrief.pdf
(discussing the development of programs designed to educate sex workers about
condom use); see also Sheetal Doshi, Sex Workers on the Front Line – of Prevention,
CTR.
FOR
PUB.
INTEGRITY
(Nov.
30,
2006),
THE
http://projects.publicintegrity.org/aids/report.aspx?aid=803 (discussing an effective
strategy implemented by one anti-AIDS organization in India).
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of condom use, but decided to forgo further funding when it learned of the
“pledge requirement” stated in the United States Leadership Against
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act)4 and
the proposed HHS regulation implementing the requirement.5 Instead, the
NGO’s legal counsel challenged the constitutionality of the pledge
requirement and HHS’s interpretive guidelines in federal court.6
Scholars and field experts have argued extensively that the U.S. policy
stating that fund recipients may not promote prostitution is unconstitutional
because it compels speech.7 In response, HHS published a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register to clarify what
grantee organizations may do without being deemed as promoting
prostitution.8 On December 24, 2008, HHS issued a final rule to further
clarify the rule’s separation requirement.9 The final rule states that
Leadership Act fund recipients that have a policy opposing prostitution
may maintain an affiliation with organizations that do not have such a
policy as long as there is adequate separation between the two
organizations.10 However, grantee organizations have continued to
complain that such guidelines are still vague and cause unwarranted
chilling affects on HIV/AIDS outreach and treatment programs.11
This Comment argues that courts and administrative agencies should
interpret the terms “promoting,” “advocating,” “endorsing,” and
“supporting” in ways that accurately reflect congressional intent and
mitigate the chilling effect current U.S. guidelines have on NGO
activities.12 Part II.A discusses the substance and purpose of the
4. 22 U.S.C. §§ 7601-82 (2006).
5. See Doshi, supra note 3 (describing cancellation of expansion plans).
6. See 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e) (barring “promot[ion]” of prostitution); 22 U.S.C. §

7631(f) (requiring policies that “explicitly oppos[e] prostitution”); see also, e.g.,
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d 222,
274 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter AOSI I] (holding the pledge requirement to be
“offensive to the First Amendment”).
7. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 1-2 (describing federal court cases finding
the pledge requirement to be unconstitutionally compelled speech).
8. See Regulation on the Organizational Integrity of Entities Implementing
Leadership Act Programs and Activities, 73 Fed. Reg. 20,900 (Apr. 17, 2008) (codified
at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88 (2010)) (responding to complaints that the Leadership Act does not
explicitly delineate prohibited activities).
9. See Regulation on the Organizational Integrity of Entities That Are
Implementing Programs and Activities Under the Leadership Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,997
(Dec. 24, 2008) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88 (2010)) (describing necessary separation
between fund recipients and affiliates).
10. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 20,901-02 (defining “adequate separation” as financial and
legal separation).
11. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 4 (discussing the counterproductive and
self-censoring effects of the anti-prostitution pledge).
12. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 928 (9th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000))
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Leadership Act and its anti-prostitution pledge requirement.13 Part II.B
discusses the guidelines issued by the funding agencies in an attempt to
clarify what actions constitute promoting prostitution.14 Part II.C shows
how courts have interpreted “promoting” in the anti-terrorism funding and
government-endorsed religion contexts.15 Part II.D notes that courts have
invalidated the pledge requirement as unconstitutionally inhibiting First
Amendment free speech rights.16 Part III.A argues that the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) and HHS administrative
guidelines (Guidelines) are vague and require impracticable separation.17
Part III.B contends that the Guidelines should be struck down under the
vagueness test, mens rea requirement, and direct subsidy theory used in the
anti-terrorism and Establishment Clause contexts.18 Part III.C argues that
the Guidelines contradict HHS’s funding practices in the faith-based
context and therefore should be less restrictive.19 Part IV proposes that
courts and funding agencies should strike down the pledge requirement
because it compels speech and that the agencies should amend the
Guidelines to make the “promotion” language less restrictive.20 This
Comment concludes that specific delineations of what constitutes
promoting prostitution and less burdensome restrictions would alleviate the
unnecessary chilling effect currently suffered by NGOs.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Leadership Act: An Attempt by Congress to Eradicate Prostitution
Congress passed the Leadership Act in May 2003, authorizing $15
(holding that a statute containing terms ambiguous to people of ordinary intelligence
must be struck down).
13. See infra Part II.A (explaining how Congress intended to stop the spread of
HIV/AIDS by controlling prostitution).
14. See infra Part II.B (explaining how the Guidelines attempted to clarify the
Leadership Act by requiring legal and financial separation between affiliate
organizations).
15. See infra Part II.C (illustrating judicial interpretation of the term “promoting”).
16. See infra Part II.D (explaining how courts have ruled that the anti-prostitution
pledge forces fund recipient organizations to support the government’s views on
prostitution).
17. See infra Part III.A (arguing that the Guidelines should be struck down because
they are vague and require unnecessarily strict and unjustifiable separation
requirements).
18. See infra Part III.B (arguing that court rulings in the anti-terrorism funding and
religion-based contexts will help alleviate the Guidelines’ ambiguities).
19. See infra Part III.C (arguing that the Guidelines should be struck down because
they are unjustifiably more restrictive than faith-based funding guidelines).
20. See infra Part IV (illustrating how clearer regulations would allow Leadership
Act fund recipients to effectively prevent and treat HIV/AIDS).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss1/21

4

Chang: Prostitutes + Condoms = AIDS?: Leadership Act, USAID, and HHS Gui
CHANG 10/26/10

2010]

3/25/2011 7:21:00 PM

PROSTITUTES + CONDOMS = AIDS?

377

billion to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria for Fiscal Years
2004-2008.21 The Act identifies prostitution and sex trafficking as
contributing factors to the spread of HIV/AIDS and states that a U.S. policy
goal is to eradicate prostitution as a principal means of combating
HIV/AIDS.22 The major purposes of the Leadership Act were to focus on
the delivery of services through local community and faith-based
organizations and to strengthen HIV/AIDS treatment, care, and prevention
programs, especially for women, girls, orphans, and vulnerable children in
hard-to-reach rural areas.23
The anti-prostitution pledge requirement contained in the Leadership Act
is a limitation on funding stating that no Leadership Act funds may be used
to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or to
assist any organization that does not have a policy explicitly opposing
prostitution.24 The so-called “anti-prostitution” pledge was a U.S.
government initiative that required non-governmental organizations
receiving U.S. funds to sign an agreement explicitly stating that they did
not promote prostitution. The basis for such a requirement was a
congressional finding that prostitution is “inherently harmful and
dehumanizing.”25 Presently, both U.S.- and foreign-based grantees are
subject to the pledge requirement.26
B. The Guidelines: Attempts by USAID and HHS to Clarify Which Actions
Promote Prostitution
The pledge requirement applies to all grantee activities, including those
21. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 3 (2008) (explaining that funding efforts
were concentrated on fourteen focus countries and that the Office of the Global AIDS
Coordinator will lead interagency implementation of U.S. HIV/AIDS policy).
22. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-60, at 6 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 712,
712 (stating that prostitution is degrading to women and is an additional cause of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic).
23. See id. at 8 (emphasizing an approach based on local delivery systems).
24. See 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e)-(f) (2006) (implying that fighting prostitution is the
most effective way of fighting HIV/AIDS).
25. See OFFICE ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE, POLICY DIRECTIVE 05-04,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS,
TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA ACT OF 2003 – ELIGIBILITY LIMITATION ON THE USE OF
FUNDS AND OPPOSITION TO PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING 2 (2007) [hereinafter
AAPD 05-04] (describing official government opposition to prostitution).
26. See id. at 3 (describing U.S. Justice Department guidance as to application of
the pledge requirement to U.S. and non-U.S. NGOs); see also Joanna Busza, Having
the Rug Pulled from Under Your Feet: One Project’s Experience of the U.S. Policy
Reversal on Sex Work, 21 HEALTH POL’Y & PLAN. 329, 330-31 (2006) (describing the
House Committee on International Relations’ criticism of providing health care to sex
workers); Matt Moffett & Michael M. Phillips, Brazil Refuses U.S. AIDS Funds,
Rejects Conditions, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2005, at A3 [hereinafter Brazil Refusal]
(stating that the Brazilian government turned down $40 million in anti-HIV/AIDS
funding instead of complying with the pledge).
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funded through non-U.S. sources.27 In addition, USAID and HHS have the
right to investigate all grantee activities to ensure that they sufficiently
abide by the terms of the pledge.28 However, the Leadership Act does not
define what it means to “promote” or “advocate” prostitution.29 To clarify
the vague language of the statute, USAID and HHS issued separate but
almost identical administrative guidelines stating that a recipient
organization will not be deemed to be promoting prostitution if it maintains
adequate physical and financial separation with other organizations that do
not explicitly oppose prostitution.30 The Guidelines’ principal goal was to
clarify that an independent organization affiliated with a Leadership Act
fund recipient does not need to explicitly oppose prostitution and sex
trafficking for the grantee to comply with the pledge requirement.31
Additionally, the Guidelines list five non-exclusive factors that may be
used by the agencies to determine whether a recipient organization is
complying with such separation requirements.32
Specifically, the
Guidelines list criteria for when a grantee will be deemed to have
“objective integrity and independence” from an affiliated organization,
including legal, physical, and financial separation.33 These criteria for
determining separation were the agencies’ attempt to clarify how recipient
organizations may continue their operations with affiliates without
violating the anti-prostitution pledge.34 More importantly, even after the
issuance of additional guidelines, USAID and HHS maintained case-by-

27. See AAPD 05-04, supra note 25, at 3.
28. See id. at 4 (stating that the funding agencies have the power to determine

compliance on a case-by-case basis).
29. See, e.g., Letter from Rebekah Diller, Deputy Dir., Justice Program, to
Kathleen
Sebelius,
Sec’y,
HHS
(Dec.
22,
2009),
available
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/aosi_v_usaid/
(discussing
the
unconstitutionally vague language).
30. See AAPD 05-04, supra note 25 (describing USAID’s separation
requirements); DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE REGARDING SECTION
301(F) OF THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AGAINST HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND
MALARIA ACT OF 2003 (2007) [hereinafter HHS GUIDANCE] (describing HHS’s
“Organizational Integrity” requirements).
31. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30 (reiterating the affiliated organization’s
position regarding prostitution).
32. See AAPD 05-04, supra note 25, at 3-4 (requiring financial and physical
separation, including separate management, accounting records, facilities, and
equipment); see also, e.g., Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d
219, 229-33 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding separation criteria in provision of legal
services); Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 767 (2d Cir. 1999)
(upholding criteria requiring separation).
33. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 4 (stating that none of the factors are
dispositive and the agency retains the authority to consider other facts).
34. See id. at 2 (describing how a recipient can maintain “program integrity”
through separation); see also AAPD 05-04, supra note25, at 2 (revising the Leadership
Act’s blanket ban on recipient organizations’ activities with third party affiliates).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss1/21

6

Chang: Prostitutes + Condoms = AIDS?: Leadership Act, USAID, and HHS Gui
CHANG 10/26/10

3/25/2011 7:21:00 PM

2010]

PROSTITUTES + CONDOMS = AIDS?

379

case discretion to determine whether there is sufficient physical and
financial separation between the grantee and its affiliated organization.35
The Southern District of New York ruled in Alliance for Open Society
International, Inc. v. USAID36 that the Guidelines were overly broad to
meet the government’s legitimate interest and granted a preliminary
injunction preventing the government from enforcing the prostitution
pledge on U.S.-based NGOs.37 In that case, the plaintiff, Alliance for Open
Society International (AOSI), argued that the Guidelines still compel
speech, and the court agreed, reasoning that recipient organizations are still
not allowed to take a position on prostitution.38 The court also stated that
the Guidelines’ separation requirement is not narrowly tailored to meet
congressional goals, and therefore does not survive heightened scrutiny.39
C. Legal Definition of “Promotion” in Other Contexts
1. Anti-Terrorism
Courts have grappled with what it means to promote or advocate
prostitution, and the limited case law does not delve into the definitional
issue.40 In contrast, courts have attempted to define what actions support
terrorism and what actions are deemed to endorse a particular religion.41
Two leading cases regarding anti-terrorism funding have attempted to
define what it means to promote terrorism.42 In Humanitarian Law Project
35. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 4 (stating that USAID will determine
whether there exists sufficient “physical and financial separation” based on the totality
of facts in each situation).
36. 570 F. Supp. 2d 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) [hereinafter AOSI II] (holding that the
Guidelines still compel speech and are thus unconstitutional).
37. See id. at 547 (stating that the plaintiffs have shown enough cause to prove
irreparable harm if not awarded the preliminary injunction).
38. See id. at 545-46 (upholding AOSI’s argument with similar reasoning used to
strike down the anti-prostitution pledge in AOSI I); see also AOSI I, supra note 6, at
274-75 (rejecting the government’s argument that speech is not compelled because
there remains a choice to refuse funding).
39. See AOSI II, supra note 36, at 549 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 188
(1991)) (noting the additional management and governance requirements in the
Guidelines not present in other similar cases, like Rust).
40. See id.; DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir.
2007); AOSI I, supra note 6 (all confronting what it means to “promote” but failing to
give a definitive answer).
41. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 925 (9th Cir.
2009) (explaining that criminal liability generally requires intent); Al Haramain Islamic
Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1268-69 (D. Or.
2008) (establishing the mens rea and vagueness standards for interpreting whether an
organization is promoting terrorism).
42. See Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 927-28 (discussing what “material support or
resources” means); Al Haramain, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 1252-53 (discussing the relevance
of financial relationships in determining “promotion” of terrorism).
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v. Mukasey, the Ninth Circuit examined the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and its 2004 amendment, the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA).43 As amended, AEDPA
states that if one “knowingly provides material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization,” he has promoted terrorism.44 AEDPA goes
on to state that, “material support or resources” includes property, services
(including financial services), lodging, training, and expert advice or
assistance.45 In Mukasey, the court stressed the mens rea requirement of
the amendment and established the rule that a person meets the requirement
if they provide material support or resources to a designated terrorist
organization knowing that: (1) the organization is a designated terrorist
organization; or (2) the organization has engaged, or is engaging, in
terrorist activity.46 In addition, the court also stated that because AEDPA
fails to notify a person of ordinary intelligence as to what is considered
“material support or resources,” that part of the statute is unconstitutionally
vague.47
In another terrorism case, the District Court of Oregon attempted to
define the term “promote” in the anti-terrorism funding context. In Al
Haramain Islamic Foundation v. U.S. Department of Treasury, the court
stated that if one provides financial, material, technological, and other
support to a designated terrorist organization, one promotes terrorism.48 In
that case, the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF) was designated as a
terrorist organization, and the court stated that its subsidiary organization,
AHIF-Oregon, supported terrorism because it had a “close financial
relationship” with AHIF.49 Additionally, the court stated that money is
fungible, making it possible that funds may be used either directly or

43. See Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 923 (stating that Congress intended to clarify the
AEDPA restrictions by defining “training” and “expert advice or assistance”).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
45. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A(b), 2339B(g)(4) (amending the definition of “material
support or resources” to include the prohibition against providing “expert advice or
assistance”).
46. See Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 922-23 (stating that the circuit had already ruled that
the government must prove criminal intent in Humanitarian Law Project v. United
States Dep’t of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003)).
47. See id. at 925 (reiterating that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
requires statutes to clearly delineate the conduct they proscribe); see, e.g., Foti v. City
of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasizing the importance of
clearly delineated statutes).
48. See Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 585 F. Supp. 2d
1233, 1251 (D. Or. 2008) (implying that an organization must take the initial steps to
distinguish itself from a designated terrorist organization).
49. See id. at 1250 (indicating that a website hosting articles in support of terrorist
acts, and posting photographs and videos depicting violent terrorist activities, was
sufficient to prove a close financial relationship).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss1/21

8

Chang: Prostitutes + Condoms = AIDS?: Leadership Act, USAID, and HHS Gui
CHANG 10/26/10

2010]

3/25/2011 7:21:00 PM

PROSTITUTES + CONDOMS = AIDS?

381

indirectly to promote terrorism.50 However, unlike in Mukasey,51 the court
in Al Haramain did not define “promoting terrorism” as knowingly
providing material support to a terrorist organization.52 Instead, the court
merely stated that the government did not have the burden to prove that an
organization intended to support terrorism.53 The court concluded that an
organization’s “affirmative conduct” of providing financial support and
services to a terrorist organization was sufficient to constitute promoting
terrorism.54 The court’s ruling in Al Haramain was significant because it
provided a clear rule to organizations that if they gave money to a
designated terrorist organization, or provided any services to such an
organization, they were promoting terrorism.55
2. Faith-Based Initiatives
Faith-based initiatives are another area in which courts and federal
agencies have attempted to define “promotion.”56 In Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District, parents of a deaf student attending a Catholic
high school brought an action to require the school district to provide an
interpreter for the student.57 The Supreme Court held that providing an
interpreter under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) to
a student attending a Catholic high school did not violate the Establishment
50. See id. at 1251; Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136; Farrakhan v.
Reagan, 669 F. Supp. 506, 512 (D.D.C. 1987) (stating that even contributions for
peaceful purposes can be used unlawfully).
51. See Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 916 (stating that statutes must be sufficiently clear so
that a person of ordinary intelligence reasonably knows what is prohibited).
52. See Al Haramain, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 1259 (stating that specific intent is
irrelevant if the evidence provides reasonable belief that an organization provided any
support to a designated terrorist organization).
53. See id. But see Holy Land Found. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 160 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (noting that courts are bound to consider whether the agency’s designation was
reasonable based on the evidence present in the record).
54. See Exec. Order No. 13224, 3 C.F.R. 768 (2001), reprinted in 3 U.S.C. § 301
(2006) (reiterating Office of Foreign Aseets Control’s authority to prevent financial
transactions between U.S. citizens which it has reasonable cause to believe pose a risk
of furthering terrorist acts in the United States).
55. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES:
VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S. BASED CHARITIES 5-7 (2002), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/docs
/guidelinescharities.pdf (stressing the protection of charities against unintended
diversion of charitable support to terrorist organizations). But see OMB WATCH,
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: HOW THE WAR ON TERROR HURTS CHARITIES, FOUNDATIONS,
AND THE PEOPLE THEY SERVE 16 (2008) (arguing that the Treasury guidelines do not
prevent the diversion of terrorism funds and, instead, hinder charitable operations).
56. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993) (stating that
the government may not use public schools as a forum to convey religious viewpoints).
57. See id. (arguing that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the school to provide an
interpreter).
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Clause and in turn did not constitute the government promoting religion.58
The Court stated that if programs funded by the federal governments
resembled a “direct subsidy,” the program was promoting religion.59
Furthermore, the Court in Zobrest ruled that if a program is relieved of
expenses that it otherwise would have assumed, and if the attenuated
financial benefits received by the parochial school are not attributable to
private, individual choices, the program is promoting religion.60 The Court
reasoned that the Catholic school was not relieved of such an expense, and
that because disabled students, not the schools, are the primary
beneficiaries of the IDEA, the government is not promoting religion by
providing interpreter services.61
Additionally, the Supreme Court has ruled that a program does not
promote religion when it provides benefits to recipients who apply their aid
to religious education.62 In Witters v. Washington Department of Services
for the Blind, a blind student pursuing a Bible studies degree at a Christian
college appealed a denial of financial vocational assistance from the
Washington State Commission for the Blind.63 The Court ruled that this
funding program is paid directly to blind students and that it does not
advance religion because the funds are made available generally without
regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic, nature of the
grantee organization.64 Additionally, the Court stated that because the
funds go directly to individuals and not to the organization, the decision to

58. See id. (stating that providing the interpreter does not violate the Establishment
Clause because the government is offering a neutral service as part of an unbiased
program). But see id. at 18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the government is
participating in a school’s inculcation of religion if secular and sectarian activities are
intertwined).
59. Cf. Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983
SUP. CT. REV. 83, 94-98 (1999) (stating that the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause
decisions have intensified religious conflict through ambiguous standards).
60. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 14 (majority opinion); see also Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 432 (1961) (implying
that the Establishment Clause is viewed as a prohibition of improper governmental
power).
61. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13 (reasoning that it was the disabled children, and not
the religious institution, that was receiving the benefit from the IDEA); cf. Norman
Dorsen, The Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 863, 868
(1987) (arguing that the purpose of the Establishment Clause is safeguarding minorities
with respect to religious belief).
62. See Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 483, 488 (1986)
(recognizing the significance of equal access to school-related benefits).
63. See id. at 483-84 (distinguishing vocational assistance from funding intended to
subsidize religious activities).
64. See id. at 488; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 81 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(implying that the constitutionality of Establishment Clause issues should be based on
coercion or unwilling indoctrination, not simple endorsement).
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support religious education is made by the individual, not by the
government.65
3. Abortion
In addition to defining “promotion,” the Supreme Court has ruled that
statutory separation requirements must be narrowly tailored to effectuate
the government’s intent.66 The plaintiffs in Rust v. Sullivan challenged the
program integrity requirement of Title X of the Public Health Service
Act.67 In that statute, the program integrity requirement states that Title X
programs shall not provide counseling services related to abortion, and that
Title X projects may not engage in activities that “encourage, promote, or
advocate abortion.”68 Additionally, the federal government requires that
Title X projects must be “physically and financially separate” from
abortion activities.69 The statute also states that to be deemed physically
and financially separate, a Title X project must have “objective integrity
and independence” from prohibited activities.70
The administrative guidelines interpreting the Title X objective integrity
requirement list various factors used to determine the existence of adequate
separation.71 The Supreme Court in Rust ruled that the administrative
guidelines were narrowly tailored to meet the government’s interest in
prohibiting abortion because the regulation is not a general law designed to
single out a disfavored group, but rather one that specifically excludes
certain activities from the scope of the funded projects.72 The Court also
upheld the separation requirements because the requirements did not bar
abortion referral or counseling where a pregnant woman’s health was in
65. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488 (reasoning that the choice of institution is left to
the students, and therefore it is not Washington state that decides where the funds go);
cf. PAUL KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 37 (1964) (stating that religion is
being used to disqualify certain organizations from receiving public funds if such funds
are available for all educational institutions except those controlled by a religious
body).
66. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 180 (1991) (noting similar government
interests as those stated in the HIV/AIDS funding cases).
67. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300(a)(6) (2006); see also Rust, 500 U.S. at 178-79
(providing federal funding for family planning services).
68. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 179-80 (recognizing the government’s discretion to
choose to fund one type of activity over another).
69. See id. at 174 (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim that the Title X regulations
reversed a long-standing agency policy permitting nondirective abortion counseling).
70. See id. at 180-81 (enumerating the ways the Secretary could distinguish
prohibited activities from those allowed under the statute).
71. See id. at 180 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1989)) (stating that abortion-related
activities must be kept separate and distinct from Title X activities).
72. See id. at 195; see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1983) (noting that the regulations were targeting a
small group within the press on the basis of speech content).
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serious peril.73
D. First Amendment Challenges to the Anti-Prostitution Pledge
Requirement
Previous lawsuits have challenged the validity of the anti-prostitution
pledge, alleging that the pledge required NGOs to positively assert the
government’s view, therefore violating their First Amendment rights.74
Notably, in Alliance for Open Society International v. USAID, AOSI
asserted a free speech challenge to the Leadership Act’s pledge
requirement and sought clarification of the Act’s requirements.75 The
plaintiffs were all U.S.-based, non-profit organizations working to limit the
spread of HIV/AIDS worldwide, and consequently, they worked closely
with highly vulnerable populations, including those engaged in
prostitution.76
The Southern District of New York ruled in favor of the plaintiffs’ First
Amendment free speech violation claims, acknowledging that the pledge
requirement chilled AOSI from planning and co-sponsoring a sex work
conference.77 The court stated that the plaintiffs had sufficiently proven
grounds of irreparable harm suffered from their loss of First Amendment
freedoms and ordered a preliminary injunction against the pledge
requirement.78 Additionally, the court ruled that the Guidelines require
more separation than is “reasonably necessary” to justify the governmental
interests.79 The court also ruled that the guidelines impermissibly compel
speech, that they would not survive heightened scrutiny, and that they are

73. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 195 (stating that the regulations only prohibit abortion
counseling as a “method of family planning,” not when a woman’s life is in danger).
74. See DKT Int’l v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 761 (D.C. Cir.
2007); AOSI I, supra note 6, at 237-38 (citing Plaintiffs’ argument that the pledge
requirement unconstitutionally forces them to convey the government’s message
against prostitution).
75. See AOSI I, supra note 6, at 235 (detailing Plaintiffs’ demand for clarification
of guidelines); Complaint at 34, Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l v. U.S. Agency for Int’l
Dev. (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 05-cv-8209) (implying that in contrast to DKT’s argument,
AOSI acknowledges the that various harms that sex work may inflict on individuals).
76. See AOSI I, supra note 6, at 230; see, e.g., Doshi, supra note 3 (proffering the
significance of personal relationship building in the effort of preventing the spread of
HIV/AIDS).
77. See AOSI I, supra note 6, at 278 (citing Paulsen v. Cnty of Nassau, 925 F.2d
65, 68 (2d Cir. 1991)) (stating that the loss of First Amendment freedoms
unquestionably constitutes irreparable harm).
78. See id. at 278; Kushen Decl. at 53-54, AOSI I, supra note 6, at 222 (explaining
why AOSI could not sponsor a conference dealing with sex worker topics); see also
Green Party v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 389 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2004)
(reiterating the irreparable harm caused by First Amendment violations).
79. See AOSI II, supra note 36, at 549.
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unconstitutionally vague.80
III. ANALYSIS
A. USAID and HHS Administrative Guidelines Describing Which Actions
Promote Prostitution Are Unconstitutionally Vague and Require
Impracticable Separation Requirements.
The Guidelines are unconstitutionally vague because they reserve too
much discretion to the funding agencies in determining which actions
promote prostitution.81 Grantees receiving Leadership Act funds have no
assured method of determining whether their operations meet the guideline
standards because it only lists five non-exclusive factors in determining the
legitimacy of grantee activities.82 Moreover, the Guidelines reserve to the
funding agencies the right to take other undisclosed factors into account
and the right to determine compliance on a case-by-case basis.83 The
Guidelines are thus unconstitutionally vague because they contain no
provisions by which recipient organizations may seek approval for
affiliation proposals.84 The vagueness exposes recipient organizations to
inconsistent enforcement and possible political retribution.85
Additionally, the Guidelines fail to notify a person of ordinary
intelligence as to what conduct violates its provisions.86 The Due Process
80. See id. (stating that the government’s interest in conveying a uniform message
on prostitution is not met because a substantial number of organizations are exempt
from the Guidelines).
81. See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman and Rep. Barbara Lee, to
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, HHS (Dec. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Waxman Letter],
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/2f7d571dba331b96a1_3hm6bffbh.pdf (arguing
that the agencies’ discrepancy discourages affiliation between recipients and other
organizations providing HIV/AIDS services).
82. See, e.g., Comments on Office of Global Health Affairs Regulation on the
Organizational Integrity of Entities Implementing Leadership Act Programs and
Activities, 74 Fed. Reg. 61,096 (Nov. 23, 2009) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 89 (2010))
(stating that the guidelines provide no guidance about when it is necessary to establish
an affiliate).
83. See 22 C.F.R. § 226.62(a)(3) (2007) (listing the penal authority given to
USAID when it finds non-compliance); see also U.S. v. Gatewood, 173 F.3d 983, 987
(6th Cir. 1999) (implying that more detailed criteria for determining compliance give
administrative agencies less deference).
84. Cf. Cullen v. Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that the
government cannot have a legitimate interest in discouraging the exercise of
constitutional rights).
85. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 5 (listing the HHS’s non-exclusive
criteria for deciding whether sufficient physical and financial separation exists between
the Recipient and an affiliate).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)) (stating that the Fifth
Amendment requires that statute a be sufficiently clear so as not to cause a person to be
confused about the prohibited conduct).
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Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires statutes to delineate clearly the
conduct they proscribe,87 and when sensitive First Amendment free speech
rights are concerned, the requirement for clarity is heightened.88 Because
the Guidelines lack clear direction on this matter, recipient organizations
are forced to comply with each factor and unnecessarily maintain the
maximum level of separation between themselves and their affiliates.89
Thus, the Guidelines fail the heightened scrutiny test mandated by the
Supreme Court in First Amendment cases.
The Guidelines also fail to define critical terms. As a result, recipient
organizations still do not know whether privately funded programs with sex
workers are prohibited from receiving Leadership Act funds such that they
must be performed through a separate affiliate.90 Thus, the Guidelines fail
to give the person of “ordinary intelligence” a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited and to provide explicit standards for organizations
applying such standards.91 Moreover, courts should strike down the
Guidelines because they do not define what activities are inconsistent with
the recipient organization’s opposition to prostitution.92
Additionally, the Guidelines fail to define what constitutes an “affiliated
organization.”93 Such failure subjects recipient organizations to increased
risk of sanctions for maintaining relationships with third parties.94 HHS’s
broad definition of “affiliate” used in the food and drug regulation context
87. Compare Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 1998)
(emphasizing the unambiguous delineation required by the Fifth Amendment), with
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332
U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947)) (stating that impossible standards of clarity are not required to
satisfy the Due Process Clause).
88. See Info. Providers’ Coal. for the Def. of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928
F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 1991) (suggesting a heightened scrutiny standard for First
Amendment free speech protections because such rights are inherently more valuable).
89. Cf. Julia L. Ernst et al., The Global Pattern of U.S. Initiatives Curtailing
Women’s Reproductive Rights: A Perspective on the Increasingly Anti-Choice Mosaic,
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 752, 760 (2008) (analyzing the undermining effects of U.S.
foreign policy on women’s reproductive rights).
90. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 5 (overlooking the court’s ruling in
AOSI, which denounced the Leadership Act’s failure to define “promote”).
91. See Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
92. See 45 C.F.R. § 1610.2(b) (2010) (incorporating statutory definitions of
prohibited activities); see also AAPD 05-04, supra note 25, at 3-4 (requiring objective
integrity and independence between recipient organizations and affiliates); cf. Gentile
v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048 (1991) (condemning a statute using words
like “general” and “elaboration” because such terms of degree do not provide clear
guidance for determining unlawful conduct).
93. See AAPD 05-04, supra note 25, at 3-4 (depriving recipient organizations the
opportunity to establish and maintain effective working relations with third parties).
94. See 73 Fed. Reg. 78,997, 78,999 (Dec. 24, 2008) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 88
(2010)) (omitting the term “affiliate” in response to complaints that the term was vague
and undefined).
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is inferred in the Guidelines, and the failure to limit the term violates the
recipient organizations’ First Amendment free speech rights.95 The
Guidelines’ broad definitions of critical terms force the recipient
organizations to adopt the government’s view on prostitution.
More importantly, the Guidelines fail to define restricted activities and
are inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rust v. Sullivan.96
Unlike Rust, where the separation requirements were upheld because they
were necessary to assure the government’s intentions, the Guidelines
require additional management and governance separation.97
The
government’s interest regarding the Guidelines is identical to that in Rust;
however, the additional management and governance requirements add
unjustifiable burdens that were not present in Rust.98 The Guidelines are
not narrowly tailored to meet the government’s interest because they ignore
the existence of a less burdensome affiliate scheme used in Rust.99 Also,
unlike Rust, where the separation requirements did not exempt a number of
significant organizations, the Guidelines exempt many key organizations,
thus undermining the government’s stated interest in conveying a uniform
message opposing prostitution.100 Furthermore, different from Rust, where
the Court upheld the separation requirements because the absence of a
separate governance requirement allowed fund recipients to maintain
control over affiliates, the Guidelines mandate that recipients may only
express views contrary to the government’s opposition to prostitution
through affiliates over which recipients have no control over.101 The
Guidelines’ separation requirements are not justified by the government’s
interest in opposing prostitution.
Furthermore, courts should adopt the standards from Foti v. City of
Menlo Park when interpreting the “promote” language because that case
effectively dealt with a similarly burdensome ban.102 The court in that case
struck down a picketing ban because law enforcement officers would have
95. See 21 C.F.R. § 203.3(t) (2010) (defining “affiliate” as an organization that is
either associated with or a subsidiary of a charitable organization).
96. See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
97. See id. at 196 (stating that the First Amendment rights at issue were not
violated by the separation requirements).
98. See id. at 196-97 (implying the significance of management and governance
autonomy in determining the adequacy of separation requirements).
99. See id. (determining that separation requirements must follow less-burdensome
schemes if the governmental interests at stake are equivalent).
100. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 4; see also AOSI I, supra note 6, at 269
(challenging the government’s argument that the Guidelines’ exemptions should play
no role in determining the adequacy of the separation requirements).
101. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196 (limiting the separation requirement’s authority to
affiliates that are under the control of the fund recipient).
102. See generally Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 1998).
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had to confusingly evaluate a myriad of factors in determining
compliance.103 Similarly, courts should strike down the Guidelines because
they call for overly harsh requirements.104 Before implementing any
federally funded program, a recipient must evaluate all of these
restrictions.105 However, the legal, physical, and financial separation
requirements are more burdensome than the picketing ban in Foti because
the funding agencies reserve the right to take all relevant factors into
account even if they are not listed explicitly in the guidelines.106 Also
similar to Foti, where the picketing regulation was struck down because it
delegated impermissible discretion to the police, the Guidelines
unconstitutionally reserve basic policy matters to USAID and HHS and
allow them to adjudicate on an “ad hoc and subjective basis.”107 Moreover,
like the Foti regulations, the guidelines are unconstitutional because the
agencies may take into account a “myriad of factors” when determining
compliance.108 The Guidelines’ five non-exclusive factors allow a “real
possibility” of discriminatory enforcement.109
B. The Guidelines Should Be Struck Down Because They Inaccurately
Interpret the Congressional Intent Behind the Leadership Act.
The Guidelines improperly interpret the legislative intent behind the
Leadership Act. The text of the statute states that the purpose of the statute
is to strengthen U.S. leadership in combating HIV/AIDS by providing
technical assistance and training and by encouraging the expansion of
private sector efforts and expanding public-private sector partnerships.110
However, the Guidelines, which were designed to clarify how recipient
organizations may continue working with affiliates without violating the

103. See id. at 639 (listing various factors that must be considered to determine
compliance with the picketing ban).
104. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 4 (requiring the existence of separate
personnel, management, and governance, separate accounts, accounting records, and
timekeeping records, and separate use of facilities, equipment and supplies).
105. See id. (insisting the agency’s authority to give greater weight to any one of the
listed factors).
106. See AAPD 05-04, supra note 25, at 4; HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 4
(listing non-exclusive factors and reserving the right to determine each case on the
totality of circumstances).
107. See Foti, 146 F.3d at 639 (condemning Menlo Park’s regulation’s broad,
sweeping language and unlimited discretion given to the police).
108. See id.; see also HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 5 (stating that considering a
broad range of factors may allow officers to subjectively decide noncompliance).
109. See HHS GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 4; see also United States v. Wunsch, 84
F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 1996) (reiterating the imprecise nature of the regulations).
110. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 5 (2008) (explaining the statute’s purpose
to strengthen health care capacity through local training).
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anti-prostitution pledge, do not advance these purposes.111 Congress
sought partnerships with NGOs with HIV/AIDS experience because they
“have proven effective in combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic and can be a
resource in assisting indigenous organizations in severely affected
countries.”112
However, the Guidelines severely undermine these
partnership efforts by alienating the very communities with which the
NGOs must work.113
Moreover, the anti-prostitution pledge itself is not supported by the
Leadership Act’s legislative history.114 Similar to FCC v. League of
Women Voters, where the disputed provision was added by a House
amendment with no debate and was held unconstitutional, the pledge
requirement should be invalidated.115 Although the government argues that
NGOs must endorse the government’s view in both their publicly and
privately funded operations to not undermine its viewpoint-based program,
Representative Chris Smith did not cite any justification for extending the
pledge requirement to privately funded activities.116
The Guidelines contradict the legislative history behind the Leadership
Act and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rust. The Court has held that when
the legislative history is ambiguous with respect to the regulations at issue,
courts should defer to the agency’s expertise.117 However, unlike Rust,
where the Court clearly found that the legislative history was ambiguous
and thus exonerated the agency’s regulations, the Leadership Act’s
legislative history is clear that treating and preventing HIV/AIDS through
cooperation is the priority.118 Also, unlike Rust, where the Court upheld
111. See, e.g., Lauren E. Baer, Recent Development: Making Enemies from Allies:
How the Global AIDS Act Undermines Partnerships to Combat AIDS and Sex
Trafficking, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 513, 516-17 (2006) (listing examples of noted
charitable organizations refusing U.S. funds in fear of not complying with vague
Guidelines).
112. See 22 U.S.C. § 7601(18) (2006) (acknowledging the effectiveness of publicprivate partnerships in preventing and treating HIV/AIDS).
113. See, e.g., CAROL JENKINS, JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS
(UNAIDS), FEMALE SEX WORKER HIV PREVENTION PROJECTS: LESSONS LEARNT FROM
PAPUA NEW GUINEA, INDIA AND BANGLADESH 15-16 (2000) (discussing the
effectiveness of NGOs composed of and led by sex workers).
114. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-60 at 28-31 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N.
712, 718 (failing to explain or justify the addition of the pledge requirement).
115. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 370 (1984) (anchoring its
analysis on the overall legislative scheme rather than rationales readily apparent from
the legislative history).
116. See Leadership Act, Markup Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 108th
Cong. 148-50 (March 4, 2004) (avoiding a direct justification of Congress’ interest in
expanding the Leadership Act’s reach to privately funded activities).
117. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (endorsing an agency’s power to adapt its rules to changing
demands and circumstances).
118. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 2-3 (2008) (articulating the devastating
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the HHS Secretary’s sudden change in policy because such change was
justified through ample analysis, the USAID and HHS guidelines do not
resemble a justifiable reaction to reports and comments submitted by
lawmakers and legal experts.119
In addition, the pledge requirement is not supported by the Leadership
Act’s goal of encouraging private-public cooperation.120 More importantly,
while the government argues that Congress included the pledge
requirement to ensure that all fund recipients communicate a unified
federal message on prostitution, the Leadership Act itself strives to
advocate diverse approaches among NGOs.121 The Leadership Act’s goal
of increasing the number of HIV/AIDS victims receiving prevention,
treatment, and care services is hindered by the Guidelines.122 The House of
Representatives, in reauthorizing the Leadership Act in 2008, stated that
the goal of universal access to HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment
services remains a priority purpose of the statute and that this purpose is to
be carried out through training and extending the workforce to expand the
reach of HIV/AIDS programs to those yet to be served.123 However, the
Guidelines hinder Leadership Act fund recipients from effectively reaching
out to vulnerable populations.124 Critics in the anti-terrorism field have
also condemned a similar pledge requirement.125 They argue that while the
effective prevention of diversion of funds comes down to recipient
organizations establishing trusting relationships, the certification
effect of HIV/AIDS on vulnerable populations).
119. See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman to Alberto Gonzales, Attorney
General
(June
29,
2007),
available
at
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20070629123546.pdf (addressing
the Guidelines’ hindrance on public health best practices). Compare S. Rep. No. 110128, at 33 (2007) (nullifying any requirements that impose more costly and
burdensome restrictions than those used in the faith-based context), with HHS
GUIDANCE, supra note 30, at 4-5 (overlooking the Senate’s concern for unjustified
burdens imposed by administrative guidelines).
120. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 2-3 (2008); see also 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151(a)
(West 2010) (emphasizing the effective and efficient use of federal funds).
121. See 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006) (exempting four organizations from the pledge
requirement); see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 391-92 (1984)
(invalidating a ban on television editorializing because it only regulated local stations).
122. See generally Letter from Human Rights Watch to President George W. Bush
(May 18, 2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/hivaids/hiv-aids-letter/
(expressing disapproval of the pledge requirement as undermining best practices in
HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment).
123. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 2 (2008) (stating that the reauthorization
seeks to further rebuild the health care workforce).
124. See id. at 3 (noting the vulnerability of young girls and orphans and that the
Leadership Act targets such populations).
125. See, e.g., Barnett Baron, Deterring Donors: Anti-Terrorist Financing Rules and
American Philanthropy, 6 INT’L J. OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 7-13 (2004) available at
http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol6iss2/special_5.htm (observing the chilling
effect posed by the anti-terrorism funding regulations).
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requirements damage the necessary trust.126
C. Courts Should Adopt the Approaches Taken by the Supreme Court in the
Anti-Terrorism and Establishment Clause Contexts.
1. The Vagueness Test and Mens Rea Approach Used in Humanitarian Law
Project v. Mukasey Should Be Applied to the HIV/AIDS Funding Context.
Courts should strike down the anti-prostitution pledge because other
courts have struck down similarly vague statutory provisions in
antiterrorism funding cases.127 For example, in Humanitarian Law Project
v. Mukasey, the court struck down parts of the statute, holding they were
vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would not know whether,
when teaching someone to petition for international tsunami-related aid,
one is imparting a “specific skill” or “general knowledge.”128 Moreover,
courts have explicitly stated that when a statute deals with “sensitive areas
of basic First Amendment rights,” the requirement for clarity is
enhanced.129 Thus, the statute and the Guidelines are void for vagueness
because a person of ordinary intelligence would not know what actions
promote prostitution.130
Furthermore, the Guidelines are vague because the discretion left to the
funding agencies in determining what actions promote prostitution fails to
meet the heightened standard required for First Amendment rights.131 The

126. See generally THE CTR. FOR PUB. & NONPROFIT LEADERSHIP, PANEL
DISCUSSION: SAFEGUARDING CHARITY IN THE WAR ON TERROR 9 (2005) available at
http://cpnl.georgetown.edu/doc_pool/Charity061405.pdf [hereinafter SAFEGUARDING
CHARITY] (stating that the guidelines are useless and embarrassing and threatening to
organizations).
127. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding language in the AEDPA impermissibly vague). But see Constitutional
Implications of Statutes Penalizing Material Support to Terrorist Organizations;
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of
David Cole) (defining exceptions to what constitutes material support).
128. See Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 928-29; see, e.g., Letter from Kay Guinane, Dir.,
OMB Watch to Michael O. Leavitt, Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Treasury 2 (Feb. 1, 2006),
available
at
http://www.ombwatch.org/npadv/CommentsPEPHARPledge
RuleMay2008.pdf (explaining problems with the Treasury Department’s anti-terrorism
guidelines).
129. See, e.g., Info. Providers’ Coal. for the Def. of First Amend v. FCC, 928 F.2d
866, 874 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that the government may only regulate with narrow
specificity when the issue concerns First Amendment freedoms).
130. See Letter from Rebekah Diller, Deputy Director, Justice Program, to Kathleen
Sebelius, Sec’y, HHS 4 (Dec. 22, 2009), available at http://www.
brennancenter.org/content/resource/aosi_v_usaid/ (stating that the failure to define
“affiliated organization” makes the statute vague).
131. See AOSI II, supra note 36, at 533 (requiring narrow tailoring by the
government in restricting speech); Waxman Letter, supra note 81, at 1 (stating that the
agencies’ discretion undermines Congress’ intent).
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Supreme Court has ruled that heightened scrutiny should be applied when
speech activities carried out with private funds are restricted as a
“qualification for receiving federal funding.”132 Similar to Mukasey, where
the term “service” was deemed impermissibly vague, courts should hold
that the Guidelines still fail to define “promoting prostitution.”133 Also,
like Loper v. New York City Police Department, where a statute that totally
prohibited begging in all public places was struck down because it was not
narrowly tailored to meet the government’s purpose,134 the Guidelines are a
“blanket ban” on constitutionally protected speech.135 Finally, the Supreme
Court has ruled that the government’s ability to condition participation in
federally funded programs by the recipients’ relinquishment of
constitutional rights is limited.136 Therefore, courts should strike down the
Guidelines because USAID and HHS exceeded their authority in
mandating blanket bans on constitutional rights.
2. Courts Should Include a Mens Rea Requirement When Interpreting the
Leadership Act and the USAID and HHS Guidelines.
The Guidelines do not take into consideration whether recipient
organizations knew that their affiliates were participating in prostitutionrelated activities. Courts should interpret the Leadership Act and the
USAID and the HHS Guidelines as requiring a mens rea element because
such a requirement can provide a clearer guidance for funding recipients.
Even if a statute does not explicitly contain a mens rea requirement, the
Supreme Court has held that the government must prove the mens rea by
showing that the defendant knew that his conduct was illegal.137 Similar to
Liparota v. United States, where the Court stated that absent indication of
132. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195 (1991) (applying heightened
scrutiny to reject government restrictions); cf. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164
F.3d 757, 766-67 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that regulations may be subject to an as
applied challenge if they are unduly burdensome and poorly justified).
133. See Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 924 (citing precedent that emphasized the potential
consequences of ambiguous terms within statutes and administrative guidelines).
134. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-27 (1989)
(denouncing a ban on indecent commercial phone messages because it was not
narrowly tailored to protect children from dial-a-porn messages); Loper v. New York
City Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a total ban on public
begging is not narrowly tailored to achieve the prevention of the effects associated with
begging).
135. See AAPD 05-04, supra note 25, at 3-4; see also AOSI I, supra note 6, at 27172 (prohibiting government regulations that suppress dangerous ideas).
136. See, e.g., O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 725-26
(1996) (stating that the government may not impose conditions on expressing or not
expressing specific political views on outside contractors).
137. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425-27 (1985) (noting that
eliminating a mens rea element from the statutes would criminalize a broad range of
innocent conduct).
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“contrary purpose” in the legislative history of a statute, a defendant must
have known that his conduct was illegal, courts should interpret the
Guidelines as having a mens rea requirement because the legislative history
does not explicitly contrast the notion.138 Additionally, like Liparota,
where the Court stated that a mens rea requirement is especially necessary
when the congressional purpose behind the statute is unclear, courts should
require the government to prove knowledge of illegality.139 For example,
courts have ruled that unless Congress expressly communicates its intent to
dispense with a mens rea requirement within a statute, criminal liability
must be coupled with a notion of intent to commit the crime knowingly.140
Courts should apply a mens rea requirement because it provides
adequate guidance, as has been shown in the anti-terrorism context.141
Requiring the government to prove that a defendant committed a crime
knowing that the disputed conduct is illegal provides a clearer standard for
the defendant.142 That concept in the HIV/AIDS funding context would
instruct grantee organizations that if they knew that any portion of their
activities or materials funded by the U.S. government were used for
prostitution, they would be promoting prostitution. For example, courts
interpreting the “promote” language should adopt the Al Haramain
standard because it provides clearer guidance for recipient organizations as
to what actions would be deemed to promote prostitution. Similar to Al
Haramain, where the court stated that the organization promoted terrorism
because it contributed financially to a designated terrorist organization,
courts should rule that the NGO is not promoting prostitution because dropin centers and condom distribution have not been proven to contribute to
the spread of prostitution.143
138. See id. at 425 (stating that a mature legal system emphasizes the mens rea
element because it believes in “freedom of the human will” to choose between good
and evil).
139. See id. at 427 (discussing the necessity of the rule of lenity, which can ensure a
fair warning on criminal sanctions and balance between the legislative and judicial
branch in determining criminal sanctions).
140. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488, 496 (9th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Nguyen, 73 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952)) (implying the historical significance of requiring
mens rea in the criminal context).
141. Compare Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (interpreting a
statute punishing possession of an unregistered firearm to require knowledge that the
gun is unregistered), with United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78
(1994) (interpreting “knowingly” to require knowledge that the performers in the video
were actually minors).
142. See generally SAFEGUARDING, supra note 126 (stating that without specific
targets, the U.S. government and law enforcement are ineffectively protecting our
safety).
143. See Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 585 F.
Supp. 2d 1233, 1240 (D. Or. 2008) (outlining an executive order finding that
contributing money to a designated terrorist organization is always deemed as
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Moreover, courts should adapt Al Haramain’s ruling that a recipient does
not promote terrorism if it does not have a significant financial relationship
with organizations that promote prostitution. Similar to Al Haramain,
where the court stated that a significant financial relationship is a leading
factor in determining terrorism promotion, courts should rule that recipients
are in compliance with the financial separation requirement by not
providing any funds to organizations that have not adopted a policy
condemning prostitution.144 The guidelines incorrectly require recipient
organizations to control their affiliates’ activities, yet do not take a mens
rea requirement into consideration when determining noncompliance.
3. Courts Should Apply the Direct Subsidy Theory of Zobrest and the
Witters Approach to the HIV/AIDS Funding Context
The recipient organizations’ HIV/AIDS-relief activities do not resemble
a direct subsidy of prostitution activities.145 Courts interpreting the
“promoting” language in the international development context should
adopt the meaning of “promoting” used in Zobrest, where the court ruled
that providing interpreters to a deaf student attending a Catholic high
school was not considered promoting religion because the interpreter
service was part of a general government program designed to provide
equal benefits to all children with qualifying disabilities.146 Additionally,
the Supreme Court has held that when a government funds a program that
is in no way skewed towards religion, the program does not promote
religion, and therefore, does not violate the Establishment Clause.147 Thus,
courts interpreting the Leadership Act should strike down the restriction on
funding based on promoting prostitution because the Leadership Act was
designed to benefit all vulnerable populations and because HIV/AIDS
services distribute benefits neutrally to anyone deemed a victim.148
promoting terrorism); see also Letter from Rep. Tom Lantos, Chair, Committee on on
Oversight and Reform et al., to Henrietta Fore, Acting Administrator, USAID (July 20,
2007) (on file with the author) (proposing the agency consider a less restrictive
framework).
144. See Al Haramain., 585 F. Supp. 2d at 1243 (addressing the issue of financial
affiliation as a criterion for the definition of “promote”).
145. Cf. Mehlika Hoodbhoy et al., Exporting Despair: The Human Rights
Implications of U.S. Restrictions on Foreign Health Care Funding in Kenya, 29
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2005) (suggesting that current U.S. funding policies that even
restrict non-subsidized activities are in violation of international human rights
obligations).
146. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 2, 10 (1993)
(distinguishing this program from others where schools were directly subsidized to
pursue religious activities).
147. See id. at 10-11; see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977); Comm.
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782-83 (1973)
(reiterating that non-biased funding is not problematic).
148. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 34 (2008) (stating that HIV/AIDS
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Courts should also strike down the pledge requirement and the
guidelines because the primary beneficiaries of the Leadership Act funds
are the vulnerable populations, not the recipient organizations. For
example, in Witters, the Court stated that because the sectarian schools
receiving IDEA funds are only incidental beneficiaries, the IDEA funds
were not promoting religion.149 Under the reasoning from Witters, a court
should hold that the HIV/AIDS victims are the primary beneficiaries of the
Leadership Act, while the NGOs and charities disbursing the funds only
benefit incidentally.150 Therefore, courts should strike down the pledge
requirement because the Leadership Act funds were intended to benefit the
victims, not to benefit the organizations receiving the funds.
Moreover, the legislative history of the Leadership Act indicates that
funds were designed to help all HIV/AIDS victims, especially young
women and children in more vulnerable, remote locations.151 Following
that logic, as in Witters, where the Supreme Court ruled that a government
program supplying funds to a deaf theology student did not promote
religion because the funds were equally available to all deaf students, the
Leadership Act funds should not be subject to the pledge requirements
because the funds were intended to be equally distributed to all HIV/AIDS
victims.152 Thus, courts should strike down the pledge requirement and the
USAID and HHS Guidelines because Leadership Act funds were intended
to benefit all HIV/AIDS victims. Furthermore, in the Establishment Clause
context, for a program to promote religion, the government itself must have
advanced religion through its own activities and influence.153 Similarly, in
the Leadership Act context, the government is not advancing prostitution
through the activities of the recipient organizations. Funds that offer a
neutral service to all victims need not be characterized as promoting
prostitution.154 In providing HIV/AIDS funds, the U.S. government’s sole
prevention programs should be tailored to each community).
149. See Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-90
(1986) (stating that the decision to support religious education is not made by the
government because the funds go directly to individual recipients).
150. See, e.g., POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 3-4 (stating that funds are used to
provide safety and training shelters).
151. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 34 (2008) (recognizing the increased
vulnerability of certain populations due to the lack of education and access to
preventative care).
152. See id. at 30; see also Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-49 (1991)
(stating that classic terms of degree, such as “general” and “elaboration” do not provide
sufficient guidance as to whether conduct is unlawful).
153. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825 (1995) (stating that the ultimate question in
determining religious endorsement is whether any use of government funds could be
attributed to the government); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987).
154. See, e.g., Witters, 474 U.S. at 489 (finding that neutrally available funds are not

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011

23

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 21
CHANG 10/26/10

396

3/25/2011 7:21:00 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 19:1

purpose is not to eradicate prostitution.155 Therefore, courts should rule
that Leadership Act fund recipients are not promoting prostitution because
the government is not using its activities and influence to promote
prostitution through the recipient organizations.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
A. USAID and HHS Should Issue New Guidelines Clearly Indicating How
Recipient Organizations Can Separate Private and Public Funds.
Field experts praise less restrictive frameworks as less stigmatizing and
more effective in reaching out to HIV/AIDS affected populations.156
USAID and HHS should issue clearer guidelines because public health
organizations have argued that the pledge requirement and the ensuing
guidelines run contrary to best practices in combating the spread of
HIV/AIDS.157 These organizations cite “trust and credibility” among
vulnerable populations as the cornerstone of effective anti-HIV/AIDS and
anti-trafficking strategies.158
Because such populations are so
marginalized, they are often difficult to identify, requiring extensive
relationship-building efforts to establish trust. Research conducted by
organizations like the Center for Health and Gender Equity (CHANGE)
state specific methods proven to be effective yet impossible to implement
without genuine trust. One strategy includes drop-in centers, which
provide sex workers with a safe space for gathering as well as services.
Within these centers, sex workers are provided “language classes, beauty
courses, computer access, and livelihood training.”159
deemed to support religion).
155. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-546, pt. 1, at 2 (2008) (implying that the purpose of the
Leadership Act is to treat HIV/AIDS victims and that prostitution regulation is only
one means).
156. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Legal Update: ACLU of Massachusetts v.
Leavitt, U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts, RELIGION & SOC. POL’Y. ORG
(March 7, 2000) (on file with the author); see also Waxman Letter, supra note 81
(denouncing the counterproductive effects of stigmatizing restrictions).
157. See, e.g., POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 4-5 (explaining the irony of
prohibiting activities hailed as effective in combating HIV/AIDS by experts).
158. See id. (describing the success of drop-in centers and the integral role of trust
development); see also Ban Ki Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations,
Address to the International AIDS Conference (Aug. 4, 2008) available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm/1727.doc.htm (reiterating the need to
protect sex workers).
159. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 3 (suggesting that adding permanent value
to the lives of victims through productive education is the most effective way to
prevent and treat HIV/AIDS); cf. Planned Parenthood Fed’n v. Agency for Int’l Dev.,
915 F.2d 59, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding the USAID regulations because they
were the least restrictive means of implementing a non-justiciable foreign policy
decision).
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The Guidelines should clearly state how to separate private and public
funds because doing so will allow recipient organizations to expand
effective empowerment programs.
In empowerment programs, sex
workers are trained as peer educators on HIV transmission and prevention
methods, and these programs also set up collectives to ensure that all
prostitutes in a given area use and promote condoms.160 CHANGE
research states that these programs are only successful because
organizations do not judge sex workers’ activities, and the pledge
requirements would “sabotage the trust beneficiaries have in them,
critically undercutting the success of these programs.”161
Additionally, the pledge requirement and the implementation of the
USAID and HHS Guidelines have caused a chilling effect on HIV/AIDS
funding.162 Not only are individual drop-in centers and prostitutes affected
immediately, self-censorship of donor organizations have led to the
abandonment of entire sex worker programs.163 For example, CHANGE
cites numerous interviews where senior NGO officials state that the
pledge’s ambiguous language makes them “feel hesitant to bid on USAID
funds for sex work programs.”164 Also, NGO officials reported that they
have cleared their websites of “references to sex workers or their rights”
and that they are avoiding media coverage “for fear of facing accusations
of promoting sex work.”165 These are not abstract fears. For example,
SANGRAM, a leading Indian NGO engaged in HIV/AIDS prevention
work, successfully trained and educated prostitutes as educators of male
clients. However, after its beneficiaries feared being labeled as promoting
prostitution, SANGRAM did not sign the prostitution pledge, refused
further funding and gave back the remainder of its existing funds.166
B. USAID and HHS Should Issue New Guidelines that Clarify What
160. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 3 (proffering the notion that sex workers are
the most effective mechanism for educating and reaching other vulnerable sex
workers).
161. See id. (refusing to accept the government’s position that HIV/AIDS can be
effectively prevented and treated without empowering sex workers).
162. See id. at 4 (stating that the pledge and the guidelines sabotage trust within
effective prevention programs).
163. See id.; cf. INT’L FED. OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCY’S, LAW AND
LEGAL ISSUES IN INT’L DISASTER RESPONSE: A DESK STUDY 133 (2007), available at
http://www.ifrc.org/what/disasters/idrl/research/publications.asp
(describing
the
difficulties faced by international relief organizations due to stringent funding
regulations).
164. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 5 (citing an interview with a senior
international NGO official by Veronica Magar (May 22, 2006)).
165. See id. (citing interviews with NGO leaders by Veronica Magar (May 2006)).
166. See Esther Kaplan, Pledges and Punishment, ALTERNET (March 15, 2006),
available at http://www.alternet.org/story/33284 (stating that the pledge requirement
further stigmatizes vulnerable prostitutes and destroys needed trust).
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Programs Are Specifically Prohibited.
Recipient organizations have no way of knowing whether they are
implementing impermissible activities because the current Guidelines do
not define what specific activities are prohibited. The funding agencies
must remember not to undercut programs following best practices within
the global public health community. For example, direct engagement with
sex workers is required to promote condom use and to train sex workers on
negotiation of protection strategies with clients.167 However, due to the
vagueness of the Guidelines, many recipient organizations are cancelling
such programs out of fear that such programs will be viewed as supporting
sex workers.168 Therefore, USAID and HHS must draft regulations that do
not limit the recipients’ ability to work openly with high-risk populations
such as sex workers.
Additionally, the Guidelines must not exacerbate stigma and
discrimination against sex workers. The issue is not whether one supports
prostitution; rather, the issue is recognizing the critical dangers associated
with prostitution and human trafficking and how the guidelines are fueling
social stigma. A recipient organization’s declaration that it does not
support prostitution will further drive sex workers underground, away from
crucial HIV/AIDS services and treatment.169
V. CONCLUSION
USAID and HHS should suspend issuance of the guidelines and the
administration should not enforce the Leadership Act’s pledge requirement.
Not only does the pledge requirement unconstitutionally force fund
recipients to adopt policies consistent with the government’s viewpoint on
prostitution, the Guidelines have also failed to clarify what actions promote
prostitution.170 Moreover, the Guidelines impose impracticable restrictions
that are both unworkable and will threaten the effectiveness of HIV/AIDS
prevention and treatment programs.171 Therefore, to fulfill Congress’
intention of reaching all HIV/AIDS victims equally through education and
training, the pledge requirement should be repealed and the Guidelines
167. See generally 22 U.S.C. § 7621 (2006) (emphasizing the importance of
cooperation with the private sector, especially organizations that already have ties in
developing countries).
168. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 4-5 (stating that burdensome separation
requirements do not allow recipient organizations to set up effective affiliates).
169. See, e.g., Brazil Refusal, supra note 26, at 2 (implying that the Brazilian
government’s recognition of the effectiveness of the sex workers in combating
HIV/AIDS has improved prevention and treatment in the region).
170. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 3, at 4 (lambasting the anti-prostitution pledge
for ignoring public health best practices).
171. AOSI I, supra note 6, at 270.
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should be modified to impose practicable and less burdensome restrictions.
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